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To SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE 
ON CIVIL RIGHTS. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947. Pp. xii, 
178. $1.00. 
THE President's Committee has received a well-deserved accolade of praise 
from the civilized, and of brickbats from the blood-fanatics, for its report on 
civil rights in America, of which more than a million copies have been re- 
printed. So far as I know, however, none of the commentators on this im- 
portant document has noted that it is not the first in its field. Some 78 years 
before the landing of the Pilgrims, the first comprehensive report on the civil 
rights of Americans was completed. In the concluding paragraphs of his 
report, dated December 8, 1542, Fra Bartholomew de las Casas expressed 
some doubt as to "whether it could be worse to give the Indians into the 
charge of the devils of hell than to the Christians of the Indies." Unfortu- 
nately the world's mightiest government, in 1542, was not mighty enough 
to correct the abuses that Las Casas reported. A number of high-minded 
statutes outlawing various current forms of racial discrimination and oppres- 
sion were promulgated, but they were not enforced. And because Spain, in 
its American dominions, could not assure equal justice to its people, the 
lands it ruled were blighted, and its imperial power slowly crumbled into the 
dust. 
The President's Committee on Civil Rights follows the report of Las Casas 
to King Philip in its basic conception that a man has a right to liberty and 
to equal justice before the law, not because of his skin color, religion, or 
ancestry, but just because he is human. To be human, as both reports recog- 
nize, is to have potentialities of achievement and of contribution to the com- 
mon good or the glory of God (depending upon one's language), and these 
potentialities are poisoned by intolerance. The manifestations of racial and 
religious intolerance which both these great documents recount are too clear 
to justify skepticism and too vivid to warrant retelling in poorer language. 
The documents speak for themselves. The question remains: What do we 
who read them do? 
When Las Casas made his report, he may have had some doubt as to the 
reception that would be accorded by the King of Spain to his devastating 
criticism of Spanish lawlessness and racial bigotry in the New World. At any 
rate, the preface to his Briefest Report on the Destruction of the Indies expressly 
recognizes that, since the King can do no wrong, responsibility for the ex- 
cesses reported must lie elsewhere: 
"As divine Providence has ordained that in this world, for its government, 
and for the common utility of the human race, Kingdoms and Countries 
should be constituted in which are Kings almost fathers and pastors, (as 
Homer calls them), they being consequently the most noble, and most gener- 
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ous members of the Republics, there neither is nor can be reasonable doubt as 
to the rectitude of their royal hearts. If any defect, wrong, and evil is suffered, 
there can be no other cause than that the Kings are ignorant of it; for if such 
were manifested to them, they would extirpate them with supreme industry 
and watchful diligence." 1 
A similar assumption is made by the President's Committee on Civil 
Rights. The distinguished members of this committee are unwilling to as- 
sume that the President who appointed them, and to whom they report, can 
be responsible for the violations of civil rights that their report recounts. 
Prime responsibility for these conditions and for their cure is accordingly 
ascribed, by what lawyers call an "irrebuttable presumption," to the Con- 
gress of the United States, which did not appoint the Committee and which 
has few defenders among the readers of such reports. This may or may not 
be good politics, but is certainly not good law or good science. 
Racial discrimination in the armed forces, for example, is roundly and 
justly censured by the President's Committee.2 "The Marine Corps has 
7,798 officers-all white," the Committee reports, with the effective pictorial 
representations that make this document almost unique among Government 
reports. And after a shocking list of discriminations in the armed forces, 
what does the President's Committee do? It recommends "the enactment 
by Congress of legislation, followed by appropriate administrative action, 
to end immediately all discrimination and segregation based on race, color, 
creed, or national origin, in the organization and activities of all branches of 
the Armed Services." 3 The fact remains that the President, as Commander- 
in-Chief of our armed forces, could abolish such discrimination and segrega- 
tion by Executive order tomorrow. Congress has never imposed discrimina- 
tion or segregation on the armed services by any statute, and there is no 
reason in the world why the President, in whose hands Congress has placed 
such matters, should continue to sanction discriminatory practices in the 
armed services until Congress gets around to passing legislation on the sub- 
ject. Under these circumstances, the Committee's recommendation that 
"appropriate administrative action," which is possible now, should follow 
legislation, which is neither possible nor necessary, sounds suspiciously like a 
bit of election-year buck passing. 
The same may be said of discrimination and segregation in the school, 
hospital, and recreation systems of the District of Columbia, which rest not 
upon any law but upon the decisions of the President and his subordinate 
executive officers. Segregation has been abolished in golf courses, tennis 
courts, swimming pools and theaters operated in the District of Columbia 
by the Department of the Interior, and segregation is insisted upon in similar 
facilities operated by the District Commissioners, not because of anything 
1. MACNUTT, BARTHOLOMEW DE LAS CASAS, HIS LIFE, HIS APOSTOLATE AND HIS 
WRITINGS 311 (1909). 
2. Pp. 40-7. 
3. P. 162. 
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in the law but because different subordinates of the same President have 
different ideas about racism. Segregation in the public institutions of the 
Nation's capital could be abolished tomorrow by Executive order or by a 
series of letters or telephone calls from the President to various of his subor- 
dinates. Yet the President's Committee sends its readers barking up a tree 
without possums when it recommends: 
"The enactment by Congress of a law stating that discrimination and segrega- 
tion, based on race, color, creed, or national origin, in the rendering of all 
public services by the national government is contrary to public policy." 4 
Does anyone really think that the President is now deterred from abolishing 
discrimination in activities of the Federal Government by lack of such a 
statement? Would such a statement by Congress today add substantially 
to the statement on the question of human equality which Congress made on 
July 4, 1776? 
So it is with several other subjects on which, after a learned, powerful, and 
devastating account of current evils, the Committee ends up with perfectly 
irrelevant legal recommendations. Why in the world the President's Com- 
mittee should ask Congress to pass a law to eliminate race discrimination 
in the Canal Zone,6 when the President himself could do this tomorrow by a 
phone call to the Military Governor, has never been explained. There is 
certainly no reason for continued military government in Guam and Samoa, 
but this again is the result of a Presidential decision, not a Congressional 
decision. Only the Committee's irrebuttable presumption that the President 
can do no wrong prevents it from noting that, however desirable legislation 
on these subjects may be, presidential action under existing law would be 
more effective and a great deal faster. Perhaps the Committee was actually 
unaware of the scope of Executive power and responsibility in these matters. 
Perhaps the Committee merely succumbed to the popular American battle- 
cry, "There ought to be a law," which so often blinds us to the possibility or 
the importance of enforcing the laws we already have. Perhaps the Commit- 
tee was merely being polite in not blaming the President who appointed it 
for the evils that it uncovered. Perhaps some of the members of the Com- 
mittee really believe that Kings and Presidents can do no wrong. But what- 
ever the explanation may be, the Report will send a good many letters to the 
wrong address. 
The proper address for appeals to eliminate racial discrimination and other 
infringements of civil liberties in the armed services or the civil service of the 
United States, in the administration of outlying possessions now under mili- 
tary government, in the public services of the District of Columbia, or in fed- 
eral housing projects or other service activities of the Federal Government 
is 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. When action that may be taken in the White 
House has been taken, the recommendations that proceed from the White 
4. P. 169. 
5. P. 172. 
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House to Capitol Hill for legislation on the protection of civil rights will have 
both a more limited scope and a greater moral force. 
Even in those large fields where Executive action could not by itself wholly 
eliminate the evils which the President's Committee reports, there are avail- 
able lines of Executive action which would bring us a good deal nearer to the 
goals which the Committee so persuasively proclaims. For example, Section 
2 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution expressly de- 
clares that when the right to vote is denied (except for commission of a crime) 
to any portion of the adult population of any state the representation of that 
state in Congress shall be reduced proportionately. If this provision of the 
Constitution were enforced, the poll tax states would lose a large part of their 
Congressional representation, which is at present sizeable enough to kill most 
of the progressive legislation that the President's Committee recommends. 
But it is in the President, and in his subordinates in the Census Bureau and 
the Department of Commerce, that responsibility for submitting the popu- 
lation basis for Congressional reapportionment is vested. And no President 
of the United States, apparently, has ever attempted to enforce this provi- 
sion of the Fourteenth Amendment. It may very well be that, if the Presi- 
dent acted in the manner prescribed by the law of the land, Congress would 
refuse to accept the reapportionment he would be bound to formulate. But 
at least the first necessary step would have been taken to rectify one of the 
most glaring of our violations of the Federal Constitution, and the responsi- 
bility for not taking the final step would then be clearly fixed upon Congress- 
men unwilling to accept the Constitution as the supreme law of the land. 
There is no field of legislation in which racial and religious intolerance has 
played a larger role than in our immigration laws. Anti-Catholic, anti-Se- 
mitic, and anti-Oriental prejudices are the dominant forces that have moulded 
our immigration laws for some decades. Yet even here there are many forms 
of discrimination that are primarily Executive in origin, that could be elim- 
inated by Executive action. For example, one of the more subtle but most 
basic of our discriminations against Catholic and Jewish immigration is found 
in the assumption of our immigration authorities that the early settlers of 
America were nearly all Englishmen, as a result of which more than half of 
our immigration quotas are now assigned to the British Isles, which do not 
use them. This calculation is based largely upon the use of family names as 
an index of the national origins of our native-born population. Thus families 
bearing the name of Cabot are classified as of British descent, though we 
know, as an historical fact, that the original Cabots who first visited our land 
hailed from Italy and spelled their family name Caboto. We know, too, that 
most other foreign names are Anglicized within three or four generations of 
American life. The President and various Cabinet officers of his could admit 
to our shores thousands of victims of anti-Catholic and anti-Semitic persecu- 
tion by simply correcting the distortions in our current basis of quota alloca- 
tions, which are a heritage from days of anti-Catholic and anti-Semitic 
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hysteria. An act of Congress specifically authorizes such revision.6 But this, 
too, has never been enforced. 
Of course, there are many other fields where Congressional responsibility 
is primary. The recommendations of the President's Committee for strength- 
ened civil rights laws,7 anti-lynching legislation,8 fair employment legisla- 
tion,9 self-government for the District of Columbia,10 elimination of racial 
discrimination from our naturalization laws 11 and the elimination of segre- 
tion in federal-supported institutions (on which the Committee split) 12 are 
powerfully presented and thoroughly justified. But these recommendations 
would carry greater force if they were not intermingled with evasive "buck 
slips" by which presidential responsibilities are covered up with the fiction 
that only Congress has the power to remedy our sins against the ideals of 
democracy on which this Nation was founded. The fact remains that Con- 
gressmen are human, with enough work to keep them busy even if they do 
not attempt also to do the President's work. Moreover every Congressman 
represents a small section of the United States with sectional prejudices that 
he cannot wholly disregard if he wishes to serve long enough to be effective. 
Only the President represents all the people of the United States, a people 
in which all minorities, added together, total the entire population. Only 
the President, therefore, can take the lead in a great campaign to bring the 
practices of our Federal Government into line with the ideals that have 
made our Nation great and honored as few nations in history have ever been 
honored by the peoples of the world. 
The evils which demand remedy have been clearly charted by the Presi- 
dent's Committee with respect to the place of the Negro in American life. 
Here the Committee was able to build on a vast body of scientific analysis 
of the wrongs that are suffered by our colored citizenry and the ways in which 
these wrongs tear down the society that inflicts them. 
There is considerably less clarity in some of the Committee's references to 
other minorities.. 
The most tragic of our war-time blunders on the civil rights front was the 
wholesale arrest, exile, and unconstitutional imprisonment 13 of thousands 
of American citizens whose only offense was to have been born of Japanese 
parents. Here for the first time, by executive order, we reverted to the bar- 
barity of punishing children for the crimes of their grandfathers and second 
cousins. What was done in a war against Japan to persons of Japanese de- 
6. 43 STAT. 159, 8 U.S.C. § 211(e) (1940). 
7. Pp. 156-7. 
8. Pp. 157-8. 
9. P. 167. 
10. P. 161. 
11. Pp. 161-2. 
12. Pp. 166-7. 
13. Ex parte Endo, 233 U.S. 283 (1944). 
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scent can be done in a war against Russia or Italy or Spain to persons of 
Russian or Italian or Spanish descent. Thus the civil rights of all Americans 
have come to hang on international politics. Even the administrators 
who carried out our first racial proscriptions and the attorneys who defended 
them in the courts have confessed error.14 Yet on this most critical issue of 
civil rights the President's Committee does little more than pussyfoot: "The 
proposed permanent Commission on Civil Rights and the Joint Congres- 
sional Committee might well study this problem."'5 Passing the buck to an 
agency that exists is bad enough, but passing the buck to two agencies that 
do not exist is the height of a discretion which is not the better part of valor. 
The President's Committee gets even further from reality in its brief com- 
ments upon the Indian problem. In Arizona and New Mexico, Indians are 
not permitted to vote. This is a clear violation of the Fifteenth Amendment, 
which forbids racial discrimination in the franchise. Test cases are now pend- 
ing in both states to force recognition of the constitutional voting rights of 
our Indian citizens. The President's Committee, however, suggests that the 
cure for Indian disfranchisement lies in amendments to the state constitu- 
tions of Arizona and New Mexico,16 on which, of course, the Indians would 
not vote. One rather expects enemies of federal anti-poll tax legislation, for 
example to advance the argument that this is a problem properly dealt with 
by state or federal constitutional amendments. It is rather dismaying to find 
that line advanced by friends of democracy. 
Equally remote from reality is the Committee's comment on the plight 
of our Alaskan natives, who, being robbed right and left of their sources of 
food and livelihood, are dying of tuberculosis at a rate over 30 times the 
national average. Recognizing these facts, the Committee comments: "The 
situation is such that federal officials are seriously considering a proposal 
made by the Governor of Alaska to appoint a public defender for those 
groups." 17 This statement is untrue; a suggestion to this effect was rejected 
by the Department of Justice more than a year ago and has not been heard 
from since. The Secretary of the Interior was authorized to protect Indian 
rights by act of Congress in 1849, but in 1946 Alaskan Indians were advised 
by the Secretary of the Interior that they could no longer expect his depart- 
ment to render legal assistance in their battles with white canning and min- 
ing interests. Is it likely that a local public defender could resist pressures 
to which even Cabinet officers bow? The fact is that one of the leaders in 
territorial moves to separate the Alaskan natives from their property is the 
14. See SEN. Doc. No. 96, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20 (1943); Note, 11 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 482 (1943); Dembitz, Racial Discrimination and the Military Judgment, 45 COL .L. REV. 
175 (1945); Rostow, Japanese-American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L. J. 489 (1945); 
Rostow, Our Worst Wartime Mistake, 191 HARPER'S MAGAZINE 193 (1945); KONVITZ, THE 
ALIEN AND THE ASIATIC IN AMERICAN LAW 254-79 (1946). 
15. P. 159. 
16. P. 161. 
17. P. 29; cf. p. 71. 
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legal adviser of the Governor of Alaska, the Attorney General of the Terri- 
tory. Comments upon our treatment of the natives who are held practically 
as serfs on the Pribilof Islands and denied all the usual rights of citizens, were 
discreetly eliminated from the Committee's final report. 
Equally inadequate are the Committee's comments upon the problem of 
discrimination against the foreign born and their children, a discrimination 
which has been carried to its most fantastic extremes in the enlistment poli- 
cies of the Navy's Intelligence Service, which has generally limited enlist- 
ments to third generation Americans. 
The deficiencies of the Committee's report outside of the field of Negro 
problems are not the result of any lack of human sympathy, but rather a 
natural consequence of the prevalent failure to recognize that human intoler- 
ance takes many forms. The fact that intolerance towards Catholics orJews 
does not ordinarily take the form of lynchings or Jim-Crow cars does not 
mean that such intolerance is unimportant. Intolerance towards the Negro 
does not express itself in bars to naturalization or immigration, as does in- 
tolerance towards the Oriental, nor in expropriation of Negro landholdings, 
as does intolerance towards the American Indian, but that does not mean 
that intolerance towards the Negro is unimportant. There is much that we 
have still to learn about the operation of intolerance, but it seems safe to say 
that all of its forms involve the acceptance of a non-human stereotype ap- 
plied to a class of human beings. Such stereotypes are fashionable fictions 
which save us the trouble of learning to know other human beings as they really 
are. In large part they are outward projections of our own basic discomforts 
rather than factual descriptions. We say that a man works like a dog, mean- 
ing that he works very hard, or that he is as lazy as a dog, meaning that he 
doesn't work at all, and in the common speech of the South a member of 
the colored race is often substituted for the dog in both similes.This does 
not mean that we think lazy people work hard, but only that we accept the 
object of the simile as inhuman and thus mean to say that so-and-so is in- 
humanly industrious and that somebody else is inhumanly lazy. So, too, 
when people say that Jews are communists, in one breath, and, in the next 
breath, that they are international bankers, that they are "clannish" in 
sticking to themselves and that they push into company where they are not 
wanted, those who speak in this fashion do not mean really to assert that 
communists are bankers or that people who stay among their own kind are 
forcing their company on unwilling strangers. What an objective appraiser 
of such speech gathers is that the speaker does not like Jews, whether they 
are communists or capitalists, and whether they mix with other Jews or with 
non-Jews. And when General DeWitt condemned the Nisei with his famous 
remark: "The very fact that no sabotage has taken place to date is a disturb- 
ing and confirming indication that such action will be taken," 18 the substance 
18. Quoted by Justice Murphy, dissenting, in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 
214, 241 n. (1944). 
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of his statement was that he was afraid of these people whether or not they 
had done anything wrong. 
We are all irritated at the sight of those we have wronged. That is why we 
have Jim-Crow cars and ghettoes and restrictive covenants and segregated 
schools and concentration camps for the Nisei of the West Coast but not for 
those of Hawaii, who have been comparatively well-treated. That is why 
the Supreme Court, after putting a stop to the naturalization of Asiatics, in 
1922,19 could so easily, a year later, uphold the anti-Japanese land laws, that 
the President's Committee condemns,20 with the bootstrap argument: "It is 
obvious that one who is not a citizen and cannot become one lacks an interest 
in, and the power to effectually work for the welfare of, the state, and, so 
lacking, the state may rightfully deny him the right to own and lease real 
estate within its boundaries." 21 
The same sense of irritation at the sight of those whom we have wronged 
shows itself dramatically in laboratory proportions in our treatment of the 
American Indian. Deep in the American conscience is a sense of having 
wronged the original possessors of our continent. This twinge of national 
conscience may show itself in appropriations for aid to the starving Navajo, 
or in other humanitarian efforts. But most deeply it shows itself in a desire 
to believe that the Indian is, either physically or culturally, a dying race, 
unable to utilize white man's civilization, and therefore an obstacle in the 
road to progress. And so we think of the Indian, head bowed on a drooping 
horse at "the end of the trail." In the face of that stereotype, the fact that 
Indians are today the most rapidly increasing racial group of our population, 
trying to exercise rights of local self-government and all other rights of citi- 
zenship, and resisting all efforts to "emancipate" them from their reserva- 
tion lands or other property, makes little impression. And so, because our 
ancestors wronged their ancestors, we can go blithely along legislating the 
Indians of Alaska or Nevada out of their lands, timber and fisheries, or abol- 
ishing their municipal governments and cooperatives,22 and not even a Presi- 
dent's Committee on Civil Rights takes notice of these assaults on the basic 
rights of a helpless minority. 
It is precisely because the wrongs we commit lead us to hate those we have 
19. Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922); United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204 
(1923). 
20. P. 162. 
21. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 220 (1923). 
22. As this is written a bill (S. 30) to grant lands of the Pyramid Lake Indians to white 
squatters at a small fraction of their value, overruling a series of court decisions adjudicat- 
ing the land to be the property of the Indians, has passed the Senate unanimously and is 
pending in the House; a bill to turn over Indian fisheries to favored corporations (S. 1446, 
H.R. 3859), backed by the Secretary of the Interior, has been favorably reported; a bill to 
transfer the timber holdings of Alaskan natives to timber companies has been passed by un- 
animous consent, Pub. L. No. 385, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (Aug. 8, 1947); and several bills to 
confiscate Indian land reserves and abolish Indian civic and municipal organizations are 
pending. 
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wronged and thus lead us to seek to avoid their sight, it is because these 
wrongs lead to chain reactions ending in the destruction of civilization, that 
the problems raised by the President's Committee are so vital. Oppression 
has not often destroyed the life of the oppressed, but it has always poisoned 
that of the oppressor. Vast gaps in the Committee's report which reflect 
vast gaps in popular understanding, will be filled by those who come after. 
But even if those gaps are far more serious than this reviewer believes them 
to be, the Committee will have deserved well of the country it has served. 
To have renewed the old American vision of a nation of nations, without 
aristocracy of ancestry or creed, is to have revivified our efforts to make that 
vision a reality. 
FELIX S. COHEN t 
FEDERAL PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS-QUEST FOR A SWORD. By Robert 
K. Carr. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1947. Pp. 284. $3.00. 
PROFESSOR CARR'S monograph on the federal civil rights laws comes at 
a particularly opportune time. The epochal report of the President's Com- 
mittee on Civil Rights (Mr. Carr was its executive secretary) has stimulated 
nation-wide discussion of the need to secure the fundamental rights of Amer- 
icans. Professor Carr's exceedingly useful book furnishes the indispensable 
background against which can be evaluated current proposals to strengthen 
the Civil Rights Section of the Department of Justice and to furnish it with 
new statutory weapons. 
Within ten years after the Civil War Congress had adopted three consti- 
tutional amendments and seven comprehensive statutes to protect the newly- 
acquired freedom of the Negro. Yet within an additional twenty years al- 
most this entire effort had collapsed, largely because the United States Su- 
preme Court refused to approve the program. Professor Carr's analysis of 
the debacle, like the rest of his book, is accurate and incisive. 
The Supreme Court began its attack on the Reconstruction laws by hold- 
ing that the "privileges or immunities" of United States citizens which the 
Fourteenth Amendment forbade the states to abridge referred only to privi- 
leges of national citizenship and then pumped all the meaning out of that 
term by an artificial and limited enumeration of the rights of citizens.' It 
then held that the Federal Government could not punish a lynching mob 
because the Fourteenth Amendment was directed only against state action 
and not against that of private persons.2 Finally in Plessy v. Ferguson the 
t Visiting Lecturer, Yale Law School, City College of New York; Member of the bars of 
New York, Washington, D.C. and the U.S. Supreme Court. 
1. Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (U.S. 1873). 
2. United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883). This doctrine was reaffirmed in the 
better-known Civil Rights Cases, decided the same year, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
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